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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Melvin Arthur McCabe pleaded guilty to one count 
of possession of a controlled substance and to an enhancement for a previous offense. 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with six years fixed. 
Mr. McCabe appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction. Mr. McCabe 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a 
mental health evaluation and make a determination as to Mr. McCabe's competency to 
represent himself. Additionally, Mr. McCabe asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion when it den his motion withdraw his guilty and his accompanying 
motion for a retroactive competency evaluation. 
The State raises two arguments. The first claims that Mr. McCabe waived his 
right to challenge the failure of the district court to sua sponte order a competency 
evaluation when he pied guilty. The State asserts that by entering an unconditional plea 
of guilty, Mr. McCabe waived his right to challenge any alleged failure to order an 
evaluation. Secondly, the State asserts that Mr. McCabe has failed to show the district 
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the 
district court correctly concluded that Mr. McCabe's claim of incompetence was refuted 
by the entire record. And thus, no manifest injustice was demonstrated. 
The State's first argument fails because it relies on precedent that does not apply 
in this case. The State's second argument fails because the record reflects several 
instances where Mr. McCabe's incompetence from his long-term drug use was evident. 
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was not only when his right but on day he 
guilty. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. McCabe's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did district court abuse its discretion when it failed sua sponte order a 
mental health evaluation and make a determination as to Mr. McCabe's 
competency to represent himself? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. McCabe's Rule 33(c) 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his accompanying motion for a retroactive 
competency evaluation? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A 
Competency Hearing Because The District Court's Own Statements, And Those Of 
Mr. McCabe, Demonstrated That Mr. McCabe Was Not Competent To Represent 
Himself 
The State's claim that Mr. McCabe waived his right to challenge any alleged 
failure to order a mental health evaluation fails because it relies on precedent that is 
distinguishable from this case. The State argues that Mr. McCabe waived his right to 
challenge any alleged failure to order a mental health evaluation because he entered an 
unconditional guilty plea. (Resp. Br. p.4.) But the State's reliance on State v. AI-Kotrani 
is misplaced for several reasons. 141 Idaho 66 (Idaho 2005). First, AI-Kotrani was 
represented by counsel in all the proceedings below. Id. at 69. Second, the district 
court in A/-Kotrani ordered a mental health evaluation as required by I.C. § 18-211. Id. 
at 68. And third, the district court there actually held a competency hearing after AI-
Kotrani's evaluation. Id. at 69. 
In its analysis as to why AI-Kotrani waived his right with his plea, the Idaho 
Supreme Court specifically referenced these issues. Id. at 69-70. It said 
The Defendant argues that an allegedly incompetent defendant should not 
be held to have waived any rights by entering an unconditional plea of 
guilty. Although such argument has some appeal, it overlooks two facts. 
First, the Defendant was represented by counsel throughout the 
proceedings below. There is a strong presumption that his counsel's 
performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999). 
Second, the trial court found, after a hearing, that the Defendant was 
competent to stand trial. On appeal, this Court does not reweigh the 
evidence regarding competency, but will affirm the district court's finding if it 
is supported by sufficient, competent evidence, even if the evidence is 
conflicting. State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003). Thus, the 
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is whether the Defendant received the effective assistance of 
counsel when ing to enter an unconditional plea of guilty. 
Id. at 69-70 (emphasis added) 
Here, by contrast, Mr. McCabe was not represented below for any significant 
period, 1 never underwent a mental health evaluation, and the district court never held a 
competency hearing. The district court did hold a Faretta2 hearing, but, as argued in his 
Appellant's Brief, both Mr. McCabe's statements, and those of the district court, brought 
Mr. McCabe's competence into question at that hearing. (See App. Br. pp.10-11.) If 
indeed, the real issue in AI-Kotrani was whether the defendant received the effective 
assistance of counsel, it does not apply to this case because Mr. McCabe was not 
represented by counsel when he made the decision to enter an unconditional plea of 
guilty. And, he was incompetent when he made the decision to represent himself. Thus 
the State's argument fails. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. McCabe's Rule 33(c) 
Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea And His Accompanying Motion For A Retroactive 
Competency Evaluation 
A. Introduction 
The State argues that Mr. McCabe's claim that he was incompetent fails because 
it is refuted by the record. However, the record contains statements from Mr. McCabe 
1 The order allowing his public defender to withdraw was filed on March 7, 2013, but the 
record indicates the public defender's first motion to withdraw was submitted on 
February 5, 2013. That motion stated that "the relationship between attorney and client 
has deteriorated to such an extent so as to leave counsel unable to effectively represent 
the defendant and/or his interests in this matter." (R., p.73.) Thus, Mr. McCabe was 
only effectively represented by counsel at his initial appearance and the preliminary 
hearing. (R., p.72.) Mr. McCabe did not plead guilty until May 13, 2013. (See 5/13/13 
transcript.) 
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that demonstrate his incompetence on the day he pleaded guilty. Further, at one 
he submitted to the court also showed his incompetence, as well as his 
delusional and paranoid nature as he tried to represent himself prior to his guilty plea. 
Therefore, he asserts the district court's denial of his Rule 33(c) motion was premature 
because it failed to grant Mr. McCabe's motion for a retroactive competency 
determination. 
B. The State's Argument That Mr. McCabe Did Not Demonstrate Any Manifest 
Injustice Fails Because The Record Demonstrates That His Plea Was Not 
Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary Due To His Long-Term Methamphetamine 
Use 
The that "[n]othing in the record creates a genuine bt as to 
McCabe's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or represent 
himself." (Resp. Br., p.11.) But Mr. McCabe's incompetence was evident on the day of 
his change of plea hearing. For example, the transcript from that hearing reflects 
Mr. McCabe's confusion leading up to his plea. For some reason, Mr. McCabe was 
under the impression that a transcript of the preliminary hearing had been prepared 
when in fact it was not. And he was obviously confused as to who might have ordered 
its preparation. The conversation went as follows: 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, excuse me. 
THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead. 
THE DEFENDANT: I haven't - and there's testimony that's in the 
preliminary hearing that's relevant to the trial and I haven't received the 
preliminary hearing transcript. I know you ordered it. 
2 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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THE COURT: I never did order it. I think there was an issue as to whether 
or not the counsel had previously ordered the preparation of the 
preliminary hearing transcript, and that was discussed in the motion that I 
heard before counsel, but there's never been a formal request or an order 
submitted for the preparation of that transcript itself. 
THE DEFENDANT: Ms. DePew is here and she did order it, but I didn't 
put it in the preliminary hearing, and then I think it got caught between my 
case and the case that was after mine, because she did say it after the 
case was over. 
THE COURT: Well, I went back when I heard the motion, I went back 
and listened to recording of the preliminary hearing and there was no 
request for the preliminary hearing transcript on the record. 
THE DEFENDANT: I guess I'm stuck out in no-man's-land there, but she 
did request it. It's caught between cases. I know she did. I heard it with 
my own ears, and she admitted it, but it's neither here nor there. I'm ready 
to go if-
(Tr. 5/13/13, p.4, L.7 - p.5, L.11) 
Once again, these sorts of statements, and the odd, disjointed nature with which 
Mr. McCabe spoke should have alerted the court to Mr. McCabe's confusion and 
incompetence on the very day that he pleaded guilty. He was convinced a transcript 
had been ordered but was obviously confused as to who ordered it. And the district 
court confirmed that it was never ordered at all. 
Moreover, one of the documents he submitted to the court prior to his guilty plea 
also reflected his delusional nature. In his Rebuttal to Answer responding to the State's 
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Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, he tried to argue that a 
conspiracy existed to entrap him into violating a driving suspension in order to 
probable cause to arrest him. (See R. pp.293-297.) The entire document is difficult to 
understand. But it appears that Mr. McCabe was trying to argue that Officer Summers 
served him a with a "bogus" Notice of Suspension that indicated his driving privileges 
were suspended until January 14, 2013, when in reality there was a second Notice of 
Suspension pending that began on that same date. Therefore, Mr. McCabe argued that 
Officer Summers, the officer who arrested him, purposefully let Mr. McCabe "rely on this 
first notice to calculate when the administrative driving suspension had ended in order 
to drive," and this was an unlawful "abuse of police power to bamboozle 
McCabe into believing that the driving suspension had been lifted, all the while, 
entrapping McCabe into violating that same law, then using it to establish the probable 
cause for the arrest and subsequent search." (R., p.296.) 
This sort of paranoid entrapment argument, and his confusion on the day he 
pleaded guilty, should have indicated to the court that Mr. McCabe was not competent 
Thus because the entire record does not support the fact that Mr. McCabe's guilty plea 
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, he asserts that he has shown that manifest 
injustice occurred when the district court denied his motion for a retroactive competency 
evaluation and prematurely denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Even if this 
court cannot say he was incompetent, his confused statements and odd arguments at 
least warranted a retroactive competency evaluation. Therefore, Mr. McCabe asserts 
the district court abused its discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. McCabe respectfully requests that this Court his judgment of 
conviction and remand the case for withdrawal of the guilty plea or, in the alternative, a 
competency determination. 
DATED this 1 fh day of July, 2014. 
REED P. ANDER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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